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For many years, the debate over corporate ownership and control has been in 
a rut. At least since Berle and Mean's (1932) influential work, the debate has 
centered around the percentage of corporations that are owned and controlled 
by families vs. the percentage that are controlled by independent managers. 
Some researchers have devoted their careers to ferretting out new, hidden in- 
formation which the most recent study has missed. Great significance has been 
given to a study which might find, for example, that 25 percent of the corpora- 
tions are family-owned, rather than 38 percent. Jack Niemonen's critique of our 
article, of course, is in that tradition. 
During this long debate, however, few social scientists have recognized that 
the subject matter has been changing. The simple categories of "family con- 
trol" and "managerial control" are no longer adequate. Since 1932, we find the 
emergence of powerful institutional investors. As we noted in our work, over 40 
percent of all corporate stock in the United States today is controlled by. institutional 
investors. In some capitalist nations, this trend has gone even further. For ex- 
ample, in Japan, it is estimated that almost 70 percent of the corporate stock 
is controlled by institutional investors (Wallich and Wallich, 1976). (This trend 
in Japan was hastened by MacArthur's forced breakup of the old zaibatsu, the 
pre-World War II upper-class families that controlled major corporations (see 
Halliday, 1975; Reischauer, 1977). 
Most important, our work is a beginning attempt to understand this new struc- 
ture. As our article clearly indicated, we have many unanswered questions per- 
taining to institutional investors' place in the structure of corporate power. 
Predictably, however, Niemonen's critique has questioned the data indicating 
the reality of this new corporate structure. Thus, for the most part, we must 
respond on this level. In doing so, we take each of Niemonen's main points (the 
first three) in the order they were presented. We do this not because we agree 
with the order of their importance, but because we hope to make it easy for the 
reader to compare what we and Niemonen have written. 
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Primary Criticism 
(1) The first point seems rather trivial; perhaps he would have preferred "nearly 
new" evidence? The main point, however, is that the evidence is new to the debate 
over ownership and control. Seldom have institutional investors been mentioned 
in the literature; yet, they control almost half of U.S. stock. We examined some 
of the 1980 Corporate Data Exchange evidence, published by the Senate, before 
our article was in final form. These data in no way contradict that used in our 
article. For the questions we addressed, the 1978 publication was more useful 
in that it brought together data pertaining to the largest corporations of all types, 
as well as their stock-voting rights (not just ownership). 
Niemonen may be suggesting that the 1976 data are old in the sense that much 
has changed since 1976. No doubt, there has been change in the exact percen- 
tage of stock controlled by specific investors in each corporation. But if he is 
suggesting that since 1976, there has been a significant increase in family owner- 
ship of the firms we examined, he is clearly wrong. The stock controlled by in- 
stitutional investors shifts more than that held by individuals or families, and 
this must be recognized in new theories. But for major corporations in general, 
the only change has been a steady increase in institutional stock control. (2) The second point, referring to our "sample," is clearly the most impor- 
tant and most confused. 
First, the comment that the "sample" we used was "not statistically valid" 
makes no sense. Seldom are the studies of corporate ownership based on some 
kind of sampling procedure. These studies simply examine the largest 200 in- 
dustrial corporations, or the largest 50 financial corporations, or something of 
this nature. The studies have then attemptd to explain the ownership and con- 
trol patterns of the universe selected. 
Second, Niemonen implied that our study was a replication of studies of the 
largest 200 or 500 industrial corporations, which it was not. The 122 corporations 
in the Senate publication Voting Rights in Major Corporations (with some minor 
exceptions, see U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1978:7) includ- 
ed the largest corporations in each major type of corporation: 36 industrials, 23 
transportation companies, 20 commercial banks, 20 utilities, 11 diversified- 
financial and insurance companies, nine retailing companies, and three 
investment-advisory companies. A major point Niemonen has overlooked is that 
together, these 122 corporations account for 41 percent of all U.S. corporate stock (Kerbo and Della Fave, 1983:203). The data we used was "biased toward those 
firms whose major stockholders were financial institutions" simply because we 
examined data on the largest corporations. Even Domhoff (1983:63-66) agreed 
the largest corporations are less likely to be family-owned and -controlled. If 
we want to understand the nature of corporate power in the U.S., we must begin 
with these largest corporations. The group of large corporations included in the 
Senate publication provided us with unique data on the interrelations among 
and the ownership/control patterns of the largest corporations. 
It is also important to note the value of including the largest financial and in- 
vestment firms in the group of 122 corporations examined. Becaue the stock of 
the largest corporations is often dominated by these institutional investors we 
must examine their ownership and stock control patterns, as well. Family con- 
trol of other corporations could be brought in via family control of these finan- 
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cial firms (which we showed was unlikely). Thus, rather than using a "sample" 
of corporations which produced biased results, the group of corporations we ex- 
amined was uniquely suited to provide very important, overlooked information 
on the ownership and control debate. 
Finally, in this second point, we were criticized for neglecting the extent to 
which two or more families may pool their stock for corporate control. Again, 
with the corporations examined, we stress our original statement that such stock 
pooling would be quite limited, considering how few families are listed as own- 
ing at least .2 percent of the stock of any corporation. To make this point most 
strongly, we urge readers to scan the raw data listed in Voting Rights in Major 
Corporations (U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs :30-249). The pool- 
ing of stock by two or more families no doubt occurs; however, it is less likely 
to occur with the very large corporations, given the extent to which their stock 
is dominated by institutional investors. 
Multiple-data sources may be used to locate more cases of family control of 
corporations smaller than most of those examined in our paper. But researchers 
must be cautious in using multiple-data sets of corporate ownership. It is temp- 
ting to look for data sets until you find the one you like or to take only the data 
you like from each data set. (3) Niemonen concluded his third major point by stating, "The only valid con- 
clusion sociologists can draw today is that we do not know whether family and 
individual investors play a significant or insignificant part in stock voting in 
the top 20 banks." Further, he stated that only "key insiders" know "who votes" 
the stock and "in whose interests." We devoted extensive discussion to the pro- 
blem of discovering the interests behind stock votes (p 206-8, 216-17). This ques- 
tion requires much more study with unique research strategies to indicate the 
interests behind the proxy actions of institutional investors. 
The other statements regarding who votes the stock proxies and the possibili- 
ty of significant family investors in the top 20 banks suggest confusion over the 
operation of institutional investors. In the vast majority of cases, officers of the 
financial corporation vote the stock proxies from the corporate stock managed 
by institutional investors. In most cases, the institutional investors do not own 
the stock; rather, they usually have control over the stock votes (proxies) com- 
ing from the managed stock. The Corporate Data Exchange focused on voting 
rights held by investors (institutions or families), not simply stock ownership (U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 1978:22). We have only used 
the data on voting rights. 
As for family stock control in the top 20 banks, we again stress that in most 
cases, stock votes by families are insignificant. From the data supplied by the 
Corporate Data Exchange, the following is a list of all cases where a family or 
individual is listed as having one percent or more of the stock votes in any of 
the top 20 banks: 
Chase Manhattan Corp.--Rockefeller family, 1.85 percent 
Citicorp-Kirby family, 1.33 percent 
First Bank Systems Inc.-Kirby family, 1.35 percent 
Mellon National Corp.--Mellon family, 22.61 percent 
Security Pacific Corp.-Keck family, 1.10 percent. There are two cases where 
a family has between .9 and one percent of the stock votes (in Chemical New 
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York Corp. and Wells Fargo and Co.). If you reject the view that the trust depart- 
ment of a bank cannot have its stock-voting behavior influenced by major in- 
vestors in the bank (the "Chinese Wall" argument) (p. 207-8), it can be argued 
there are a few other cases of family stock votes above one percent in the top 
20 banks: 
First Bank System Inc.-Mellon family, 1.31 percent 
First Chicago Corp.--Rockefeller family, 1.83 percent J. P. Morgan and Co.-Rockefeller family, 1.98 percent (this final case com- 
bines stock voted by Chase Manhattan Corp. and the Rockefeller family. Only 
in the case of Mellon National Corp. do we find clear family control (though we 
suggested why the Rockefeller family may have controlled Chase Manhattan 
in 1976-see p. 212). 
Secondary Criticisms 
Following his discussion of point three, Niemonen began a list of "certain other 
problems" with our article, which we assume he considred less important. For 
the most part, these other criticisms are redundant or involve other theorists 
he thought we should have discussed. We respond to most of these with short 
statements. 
(1) It is difficult to believe anyone reading our article can say we had a 
"primary focus on interlocking directorates." We equally considered interlock- 
ing directorates and stock-voting rights. (2) We are certainly aware of several studies "which have investigated the 
effects of corporate control on certain dependent variables, such as profit rates." 
In fact, a short discussion of some of these studies was cut from an early draft 
of our article. These studies have often been contradictory or have had negative 
results (for examples see James and Soref, 1981; Allen, 1981; Seider, 1977) 
because they have considered only family vs. managerial control, neglecting 
what we have called "intercorporate control" as another possible influence on 
the dependent variable (such as executive pay or profit rates). (3) Of course, reciprocally held stock is rare among nonfinancial corporations. 
In the statement referred to by Niemonen-"the stock of these corporations is 
so heavily voted by each other" (p. 215)-we assumed no one would think we 
meant anything but financial institutions. (4) We do not assume that "institutional ownership of stock must remain 
relatively stable over a number of years." As we clearly stated, we need to 
understand why there are shifts in institutional stock control (p. 217). The shif- 
ting patterns of stock control among the top financial institutions is one reason 
we suggested the concept of "intercorporate pluralism" (p. 213). The shifts in 
institutional stock control are a new reality with which theorists must come to 
grips. But to say there are shifts does not usually mean corporation x at time 
a is controlled by an institutional investor, then at time b goes back to family 
control. More likely, it simply means that at time b, the coalition of institutional 
investors with stock control in corporation x has been altered. 
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Conclusion 
We conclude with two more general comments related to Neimonen's critique. 
First, wealthy families are still out there seeking profits as they always have. 
Many of these wealthy families continue to control certain corporations. 
However, with the largest corporations, family control is either becoming more 
scarce or it is maintained by means other than stock control. Even Niemonen's 
study of industrial corporations referred to finding 25 percent with family con- 
trol. Using a 10-percent stock-control criteria, 11 percent of the 122 corporations 
in the data set we examined were under family control. While we are sure 
Niemonen would claim there are others under family control that could be iden- 
tified with better data, the differences are not great. This is especially so, given 
the differing natures of the data sets. 
Second, the study of corporate control must move from the type of ahistorical 
and ethnocentric theory and research apparently favored by Niemonen. The 
structure of corporate capitalism has been changing. We must understand the 
implications and outcomes of the change. As noted earlier, more than 40 per- 
cent of corporate stock is controlled by institutional investors today. At the cur- 
rent rate of growth, institutional stock control is projected to be 50 percent by 
1986, in contrast to only 25 percent in the mid-1950s (Allen, 1978). What happens 
when (and if) institutional stock control reaches 70 percent, as it has in Japan? 
To what degree are the economic differences between the U.S. and Japan related 
to differing levels of institutional stock control? Because we lack an adequate 
understanding of the effects of institutional stock control in the U.S. corporate 
structure, we cannot answer these questions with any confidence. 
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